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I.  INTRODUCTION 
How can it be that in the era in which almost one million Americans are on 
sex offender registries—most of whom are publicly stigmatized on websites, 
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banished from their homes, shunned from their jobs, prevented from uniting 
with their families and traveling internationally, forced into homelessness,1 all 
of which increases their risk for suicide,2 and shames their spouses and children, 
even if their offenses occurred long in the past—that the #MeToo movement 
would explode, revealing widespread sexual misconduct against women, by 
powerful men, protected by iconic institutions?3  How can we have had three 
decades of the most aggressive, “spare-no-expense” laws ostensibly designed 
to prevent sexual violence and, at the same time, observe the widespread failure 
of law enforcement agencies to take the simple step of analyzing sexual assault 
kits,4 as a first step in the investigation of allegations of sexual abuse?  How 
can these phenomena co-exist? 
This Article argues that this incongruity is not an ironic coincidence, but 
rather a flaw that goes to the heart of our contemporary approach to sexual 
violence prevention.  This flaw has, at its core, an almost obsessive focus on 
recidivistic sexual violence.  Understanding this central characteristic will 
illuminate a framework for an alternative approach to our public policy on 
sexual violence, one in which the prevention of recidivism plays but a small 
role in a more comprehensive approach to sexual violence and its place in our 
culture.   
The question posed by this symposium is whether there are alternatives to 
long-term incarceration to address violent recidivism.  My answer is a definitive 
“yes,” along with a suggestion that the alternative entails reframing the 
question.  Our current system of long-term incarceration for sex offenders is the 
 
1. Beth Schwartzapfel & Emily Kassie, Banished, MARSHALL PROJECT (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/10/03/banished [https://perma.cc/6W3S-VDDA] 
(documenting connection between residency restrictions and homelessness among sex offenders). 
2. Moore Ctr. for the Prevention of Child Sexual Abuse, News Release: Children on Sex Offender 
Registries at Greater Risk for Suicide Attempts, Study Suggests, JOHNS HOPKINS BLOOMBERG SCH. 
PUB. HEALTH (Dec. 6, 2017), https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-and-institutes/moore-center-
for-the-prevention-of-child-sexual-abuse/moore-prevention-news/children-on-sex-offender-
registries-at-greater-risk-for-suicide-attempts [https://perma.cc/BBC4-TGJ3]. 
3. Sophie Gilbert, The Movement of #MeToo, ATLANTIC (Oct. 16, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/entertainment/archive/2017/10/the-movement-of-metoo/542979/ 
[https://perma.cc/R9PJ-4W8U].  In addition to exposing misconduct and cover-ups, the movement has 
also spawned some disturbing incidents of “mob rule.”  See Times Editorial Board, Editorial: Firing 




4. Jennifer C. Braceras, The Rape Kit ‘Backlog’ Narrative Lets Police Off the Hook, BOS. GLOBE 
(Sept. 16, 2019), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opinion/2019/09/16/the-rape-kit-backlog-narrative-
lets-police-off-hook/WF4UkrHa58xVDbIn1FFyQI/story.html [https://perma.cc/ZCT6-MXXH]. 
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answer to a question that mistakenly focuses on recidivistic violence, causing a 
larger problem.  The solution is to broaden our focus to all sexual violence. 
This Article examines a suite of laws that have come to characterize our 
contemporary approach to sexual violence.  These laws share several core 
characteristics.  As observed above, their key focus and justification is 
recidivism prevention, specifically, reducing the rate at which individuals who 
have been previously convicted of a sex offense commit another sex offense 
upon release from punishment.  The laws also share the claim that they are 
“regulatory” and not “punitive,” and therefore not subject to the normal 
constitutional constraints on punishment.5  This Article will refer to these laws 
as “regulatory” laws or regime, or, for reasons that will become apparent, 
“predator laws.” 
Framing the central question about sexual violence in terms of managing 
the risk of recidivistic violence presupposes that recidivism is one of the central 
problems to be managed.  It isn’t.  The alternative is to put recidivistic violence 
in its proper place, as a small part of the problem, and dismantle the regulatory 
regime that has been built on the wildly exaggerated myths about recidivism.  
To do this requires understanding that we have developed such a singular focus 
on recidivism because it serves to protect traditional gender hierarchies.  
The past three decades have produced a massive and wide-reaching 
movement to incarcerate people convicted of sex offenses.  In addition to 
classic criminal justice responses—steadily increasing sentences6 and lengthy 
periods of post-confinement supervision7—this space has seen an 
unprecedented and unique reliance on regulatory means to achieve confinement 
and incarceration.  Such regulatory means include civil predictive confinement 
(more commonly referred to as Sexually Violent Predator laws or Sex Offender 
Civil Commitment),8 broad registration and public notification schemes,9 and a 
variety of behavioral restrictions limiting where persons convicted of a sex 
 
5. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89, 92–93, 96 (2003); Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 363 
(1997); Doe v. Miller, 405 F.3d 700, 719 (8th Cir. 2005). 
6. MINN. SENTENCING GUIDELINES COMM’N, CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT SENTENCING 
PRACTICES: CRIMINAL SEXUAL CONDUCT OFFENSES SENTENCED IN 2017, at 12 (2019) (noting that in 
Minnesota, average pronounced prison sentence for First Degree Criminal Sexual Conduct increased 
from 75 months in 1988 to 190 months in 2017); Kristen Budd & Scott A. Desmond, Sex Offenders 
and Sex Crime Recidivism: Investigating the Role of Sentence Length and Time Served, 58 INT’L J. 
OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP. CRIMINOLOGY 1481, 1482 (2014).  
7. Budd & Desmond, supra note 6, at 1494.  
8. ERIC S. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT: AMERICA’S SEXUAL PREDATOR LAWS AND THE RISE 
OF THE PREVENTIVE STATE 3 (2006) [hereinafter JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT]/ 
9. Wayne A. Logan, Sex Offender Registration and Notification, in 4 REFORMING CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: PUNISHMENT, INCARCERATION, AND RELEASE 397, 397, 400 (Erik Luna ed., 2017). 
 
JANUS_12MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2020  4:49 PM 
822 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:819 
offense may reside and what online facilities they may use.10  The proliferation 
of these aggressive forms of non-penal, non-bricks, and mortar incapacitation 
has shown remarkable resistance to a robust, empirical critique11 and to a 
growing wave of penal reforms that have addressed other aspects of mass 
incarceration.12    
There are sound reasons to conclude that these regulatory interventions fail 
to achieve the goal ostensibly set for them: a reduction in sexual violence.13  In 
fact, there is good evidence that these policies have perverse and 
counterproductive effects that impede and impair efforts to prevent sexual 
violence, such as distortion and misallocation of prevention resources, 
impairment of reintegration efforts,14leading to increased recidivism and 
impaired law enforcement,15 harm to families and victims, and deterrence of 
reporting and prosecuting sex crimes.16  These policies are reactionary, 
interstitial, atheoretical, and anti-empirical, and many critics identify these 
characteristics as reasons for the lack of efficacy and counter-productivity of 
the policies.17   
But we will not be able to understand either the shortcomings of these 
policies or the reason they are so persistent unless we explore their relationship 
to the #MeToo movement, with its exposure of the powerful coverups and 
sanctioning of sexual misconduct and the revelations of thousands of Sexual 
 
10. Jacob Hutt, Offline: Challenging Internet and Social Media Bans for Individuals on 
Supervision for Sex Offenses, 43 N.Y.U REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 663, 665 (2019); Schwartzapfel & 
Kassie, supra note 1. 
11. Eric S. Janus, Holding our Sexual Violence Policy Accountable, in SEXUAL VIOLENCE: 
EVIDENCE BASED POLICY AND PREVENTION 285, 295–96 (Elizabeth L. Jeglic & Cynthia Calkins eds., 
2016). 
12. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (federal incarceration reform 
excluding sex offenders); S. B. 7066, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2019) (amending FLA. CONST. art 
VI, § 4 by restoring voting rights to felons, but excluding sex offenders). 
13. Sexual violence, like all violent crime, has seen a decline.  But, as is argued below, the 
evidence that the aggressive regulatory laws have contributed to that decline is weak.  And, there is 
good evidence that other approaches would be more effective and more cost-effective.  See Grant 
Duwe, What Has Worked and What Has Not with Minnesota Sex Offenders: A Review of the Evidence, 
21 J. SEXUAL AGGRESSION 71, 82–84 (2015).  
14. Beth M. Huebner, Kimberly R. Kras, & Breanne Pleggenkuhle, Structural Discrimination 
and Social Stigma Among Individuals Incarcerated for Sexual Offenses: Reentry Across the Rural-
Urban Continuum, 57 CRIMINOLOGY 715, 718–19 (2019).  
15. Janus, supra note 11, at 288–89, 299–30.  
16. See Duwe, supra note 13, at 75.  
17. Janus, supra note 11, at 290–300; Duwe, supra note 13, at 83. 
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Assault Kits (SAK) sitting untested in police warehouses.18  Both of these 
phenomena reveal deep veins of persistent cultural myths, attitudes, and 
practices that allow sexual violence to flourish: “a criminal-justice system in 
which police officers continue to reflexively disbelieve women who say they’ve 
been raped;”19 a system in which the classic rape myths prevail,20 and in which 
rape is only “real” if the woman who is raped fits some notion of the “perfect” 
or “righteous” victim.21  These myths, and their pernicious undermining of the 
prevention effort, continue to flourish despite the aggressive campaigns 
underlying contemporary regulatory laws, campaigns that tout our societal 
commitment to “spare no expense” in our unflagging effort  to “save [the] next 
innocent victim.”22   
This Article argues that the flaws in the policies are not an accidental 
characteristic, but arise from, and in turn support and protect, the very 
phenomena underlying #MeToo and the SAK revelations: the cultural attitudes, 
values and practices that allow sexual violence against women to flourish.  
 
18. Ending the Rape Kit Backlog, RAPE, ABUSE, & INCEST NAT’L NETWORK,  
https://www.rainn.org/content/take-action-end-dna-backlog [https://perma.cc/DWV5-T3EQ] (stating 
at least 100,000 SAK’s have gone untested in warehouses); see also Corey Rayburn Yung, How to Lie 
with Rape Statistics: America’s Hidden Rape Crisis, 99 IOWA L. REV. 1197, 1204 (2014); Soraya 
Chemaly, How Did the FBI Miss Over 1 Million Rapes?, NATION (June 27, 2014), 
https://www.thenation.com/article/how-did-fbi-miss-over-1-million-rapes/ [https://perma.cc/A9UX-
P7PU]. 
19. Barbara Bradley Hagerty, An Epidemic of Disbelief, ATLANTIC, Aug. 2019, at 74; see also 
Rachel Lovell, Misty Luminais, Daniel J. Flannery, Laura Overman, Duoduo Huang, Tiffany Walker, 
& Dan R. Clark, Offending Patterns for Serial Sex Offenders Identified via the DNA Testing of 
Previously Unsubmitted Sexual Assault Kits, 52 J. CRIM. JUST. 68, 69 (2017) (identifying as causes of 
the backlog, inter alia, “victim-blaming behaviors and beliefs” and “budget cuts that reduced the 
number of sexual assault investigators and crime lab personnel”). 
20. See JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 79 (discussing of the classic rape myths); 
3A JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 736 (James H. Chadbourn rev. 
ed., 1970) (“The real victim, however, too often in such cases is the innocent man.”); id. at 737 (“No 
judge should ever let a sex offense charge go to the jury unless the female complainant’s social history 
and mental makeup have been examined and testified to by a qualified physician.”). 
21. See Hagerty, supra note 19.  Historically, the victim must also have been Caucasian; in the 
eyes of the law, “only white women could be raped.”  Sarah Deer, Decolonizing Rape Law: A Native 
Feminist Synthesis of Safety and Sovereignty, 24 WICAZO SA REV. 149, 151 (2009).  Women minorities 
remain the most likely group to be affected by the crime of rape and the most likely to experience 
systemic barriers to reporting.  See ELYSE SHAW, ARIANE HEGEWISCH, & CYNTHIA HESS, INST. FOR 
WOMEN’S POL’Y RES., SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND ASSAULT AT WORK: UNDERSTANDING THE 
COSTS 2 (2018), https://iwpr.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/10/IWPR-sexual-harassment-
brief_FINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/F25F-A37Q]; Victims of Sexual Violence: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE 
& INCEST NAT’L NETWORK, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/victims-sexual-violence 
[https://perma.cc/3BJD-WDYK].  
22. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 8. 
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Indeed, the thesis is that our aggressive policies are, in a perverse way, designed 
precisely to protect this aspect of our society—what feminists might call “the 
patriarchy”—from taking full accountability and responsibility for its role in 
sexual violence.  In this sense, we can say that #MeToo and SAK backlogs 
persist not in spite of, but in significant measure because of the nature of the 
aggressive regulatory policies addressed to sexual recidivism. 
At the center of our policies is the notion of the “sex offender” as serial 
recidivist predator, a distinct type of person lacking key capacities that mark 
full civic personhood.  This Article explores the origins of this idea, and its 
implications, in particular its relationship to the deep flaws in current policies.   
It demonstrates the falsity of the idea and explains how this particular figure of 
the sex offender as serial predator gets its power and stickiness from the cultural 
impetus to support and defend patriarchal power.  I end by showing that 
effective alternatives exist and argue that only the abolition of the regulatory 
measures will open the way for policies that are uninfected by their anti-
feminist core. 
A final introductory note concerns the nature of sexual violence, its 
prevention, and the criminal justice system.  Imagine a series of events, 
beginning with a sexual assault, progressing through a report to authorities, the 
law enforcement investigation, prosecutorial charging decision, the judicial 
process, the correctional process, and finally the release back into the 
community.  Recidivism, by definition, occurs at the very last stage.  And the 
“attrition” along the way is staggering.  By a large margin, most victims of 
sexual assault do not report the assault to authorities.23  And in those cases that 
are reported, the attrition is even steeper.  According to a recent article in the 
Atlantic: “[R]oughly 125,000 rapes are reported across the United 
States . . . [b]ut in 49 out of every 50 rape cases, the alleged assailant goes 
free . . . .”24  A focus on recidivism means attention to the very smallest end of 
the funnel; it excludes nearly all sexual violence.  This Article attempts to shed 
some light on the reasons for this otherwise puzzling misdirection of our 
attention. 
The precise opposite of the current approach to sexual violence prevention 
is the public health approach, which has at its center a search for and attention 
 
23. NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE CTR., STATISTICS ABOUT SEXUAL VIOLENCE 2 
(2015), https://www.nsvrc.org/sites/default/files/publications_nsvrc_factsheet_media-
packet_statistics-about-sexual-violence_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/NA4X-QKR2].  
24. Hagerty, supra note 19, at 74. 
 
JANUS_12MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2020  4:49 PM 
2020] PREVENTING SEXUAL VIOLENCE 825 
to the root causes of sexual violence.25  #MeToo and the SAK crisis vividly 
expose key root causes: prevailing attitudes and institutional practices that 
facilitate, encourage, and valorize sexual harm, and protect sexual abusers.  The 
current regulatory approach directs our attention away from these factors, 
because these factors constitute exactly the set of values that give men power, 
the “patriarchy.”  Yet it is the public health approach that most thoughtful 
commentators, scientists, practitioners, and anti-violence advocates alike 
unambiguously support.26 
This Article is about alternatives.  It suggests that our current recidivism-
based approach focuses attention too far “downstream.”  A broader field of 
vision will direct our inquiry at a better question:  can we make positive changes 
further upstream?  As one commentator observed about the SAK crisis: 
This is the question that haunts every advocate, researcher, and 
enlightened detective or prosecutor I spoke with: How many 
rapes could have been prevented if the police had believed the 
first victim, launched a thorough investigation, and caught the 
rapist?  How many women would have been spared a brutal 
assault?27 
II.  HOW WE GOT HERE: A SHORT HISTORY 
The historical development of the regulatory policies and laws has been 
described in various sources.28  Sexual violence became a subject of intense 
interest among feminist thinkers and reformers in the mid-1970s.29  These 
reformers saw multiple problems with our societal responses to sexual violence.  
Many of the problems were seen as tied to a series of “rape myths,” deeply 
ingrained ideas about gender relations and gender roles that described the 
archetypal rape.30  These broadly-held traditional societal attitudes portrayed 
 
25. Pamela M. McMahon, The Public Health Approach to the Prevention of Sexual Violence, 12 
SEXUAL ABUSE: J. RES. & TREATMENT 27, 28 (2000). 
26. See Janus, supra note 11, at 289–90; Kathleen C. Basile, Implications of Public Health for 
Policy on Sexual Violence, 989 ANNALS N.Y. ACAD. OF SCI. 446, 448–49 (2003); Sarah DeGue, Linda 
Anne Valle, Melissa K. Holt, Greta M. Massetti, Jennifer L. Matjasko & Andra Teten Tharp, A 
Systematic Review of Primary Prevention Strategies for Sexual Violence Perpetration, 19 
AGGRESSION & VIOLENT BEHAV. 346, 346–62 (2014). 
27. Hagerty, supra note 19, at 79. 
28. See, e.g., JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 20–21; see also Eric S. Janus, Sexual 
Violence, Gender Politics, and Outsider Jurisprudence: Lessons from the American Experience in 
Prevention, in DANGEROUS PEOPLE: POLICY, PREDICTION, AND PRACTICE 73, 73–75 (Bernadette 
McSherry & Patrick Keyzer eds., 2011). 
29. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 81.  
30. Id. 
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sexual violence as the product of an aberrational psychology among rapists; 
doubted women’s claims of rape, placing on them the burden to disprove 
acquiescence and provocation; and generally asserted that women were safest 
at home and in marriage, and most in danger in public.31  These myths shaped 
law, policy, and practice.   
Feminist thinkers and researchers challenged these myths.  They asserted—
and provided empirical evidence—that rape was deeply rooted in the 
“patriarchal” values and structures of the society, and therefore the product of 
societal, rather than solely individual psychological (or biological) causes.32  
Research showed that sexual violence was much more ubiquitous, and more a 
characteristic of intimate relationships, than portrayed in the traditional view.33  
In short, feminist theorists claimed, and researchers proved, that “collectively 
women are more at risk of violence in intimate relations than in public 
spaces.”34  Feminists, and other reformers, advocated for a series of reforms in 
law and policy, broadening and modifying the definition of criminal sexual 
conduct, and attempting to modify some of the law enforcement practices that 
subjected rape victims to additional trauma.35 
In challenging these myths and advocating for changes in law and practice 
to reflect the non-mythical reality of sexual violence as feminists saw it, some 
feminist ideas and reforms were deeply threatening to social conservatives.36  
The fight about the nature of sexual violence grew to a stature and importance 
similar to the parallel fights about gay rights,37 women’s roles in work and at 
home,38 and abortion.39   
 
31. Id. at 84. 
32. Ronet Bachman & Raymond Paternoster, A Contemporary Look at the Effects of Rape Law 
Reform: How Far Have We Really Come?, 84 J. CRIM L. & CRIMINOLOGY 554, 554–55 (1993); Susan 
Estrich, Rape, 95 YALE L.J. 1087, 1091, 1093 (1986). 
33. Bachman & Paternoster, supra note 32 at 570.  
34. Elizabeth Stanko, Naturalising Danger: Women, Fear, and Personal Safety, in DANGEROUS 
OFFENDERS: PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL ORDER 147, 150 (Mark Brown & John Pratt eds., 2000).  This 
portion of the text is based on Janus, supra note 28. 
35. Eric Janus, Civil Commitment as Social Control: Managing the Risk of Sexual Violence, in 
DANGEROUS OFFENDERS: PUNISHMENT AND SOCIAL ORDER 71, 84 (Mark Brown & John Pratt eds., 
2000). 
36. Janus, supra note 28, at 76–78; JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 84.  
37. See ROGER N. LANCASTER, SEX PANIC AND THE PUNITIVE STATE 231 (2011).  Lancaster 
argues persuasively that the “sex panic” that has led to our current suite of regulatory laws that “took 
shape during a period of cultural and political retrenchment in the wake of feminism and gay 
liberation.”  Id. 
38. See SARA M. EVANS, TIDAL WAVE: HOW WOMEN CHANGED AMERICA AT CENTURY’S END 
308 (2003). 
39. Id. at 46–47, 112, 182, 214.  
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The challenge to the institutions of the patriarchy evoked fierce reactions, 
symbolized in the 1991 Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings and the 
forceful and ruthless squashing of Anita Hill’s testimony about Justice 
Thomas’s alleged sexually harassing behavior.40  It was at that very same period 
that the modern regulatory regimes got their start.  I have argued elsewhere that 
these new laws provided a politically safe and powerful way for social 
conservatives to manage the trajectory of feminist-inspired anti-violence policy 
in a direction much more compatible with the traditional patriarchal views of 
gender relations and sexual violence.41  I argue here that this new direction was 
powered by a laser focus on recidivism and the creation of a new myth of 
“frightening and high” recidivism among individuals released after a sex 
offense conviction.    
The origin stories of these laws are often told.  They all follow the same 
template: They involve young children or young women who were brutally 
attacked, raped and killed.  But the key similarity is that they all reflect 
recidivist violence, attacks by individuals convicted of sex offenses who had 
recently been released from their prison sentences.  This focus on recidivist 
violence is of central importance to understanding the development of law and 
policy.  As we shall see, in the culture war then raging, a focus on recidivist 
violence allowed social conservatives, as well as the society as a whole, to 
signal its proper concern about sexual violence, while protecting some of the 
central values of the patriarchy against the perceived attacks inherent in the 
feminist reforms. 
III.  “FRIGHTENING AND HIGH” 
Very early in the development of these regulatory schemes, lawmakers and 
courts focused on a particular justification for the new laws: sexual recidivism 
rates that were purportedly extremely high.  Particularly at the beginning of this 
reform, the claim was tautologically true: that some sex offenders reoffended at 
extremely high rates.42  A Fox News posting, for example, headlined Molesters 
Often Strike Again, quoted a “forensic psychologist specializing in criminal 
behavior and sex crimes”: “It happens all the time . . . .  The dangerous ones 
have a high recidivism rate.”43  But the trope soon transformed into a non-
 
40. JANE MAYER & JILL ABRAMSON, STRANGE JUSTICE: THE SELLING OF CLARENCE THOMAS 
99, 291–300, 343 (1994). 
41. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 84; Janus, supra note 28, at 76–78.  
42. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 48–49. 
43. Catherine Donaldson-Evans, Molesters Often Strike Again, FOX NEWS (May 19, 2015), 
https://www.foxnews.com/story/molesters-often-strike-again [https://perma.cc/6D3Y-CAT3]. 
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tautological statement about “sex offenders” as a group.44  Most famously, the 
U.S. Supreme Court authoritatively characterized “sex offenders” as having a 
“frightening and high”45 rate of sexual recidivism, identifying that rate as 
having been “estimated to be as high as 80%.”46  Ira Ellman and Tara Ellman 
have traced the provenance—and baselessness—of this claim, which spread 
rapidly, being cited nearly one hundred times by courts.47  Thoroughly 
discredited, the meme nonetheless persists.48 
The significance of this meme in shaping and justifying the new regime of 
laws cannot be overstated.  It is central to the development and strengthening 
of the “sex offender” as the outsider, the other.  It is central to the focus 
downstream, rather than on root causes.  It is, thus, central to the strength of the 
predator laws as a bulwark against a feminist approach to sexual violence.   
Begin by noting that the Supreme Court’s discussion in Smith v. Doe49—
occurring in connection with its vetting of registration laws—applied across the 
board to “sex offenders.”50  The Court explicitly treated “sex offenders” as a 
“class,” referring to “the high rate of recidivism among convicted sex offenders 
and their dangerousness as a class.”51  The Court thus framed and created a 
“type” or taxon, a natural grouping of human beings, all of whom shared the 
key characteristic of “dangerousness.”52 
The Court’s language suggests that “sex offenders” are almost certain to 
rape again.  This meme underlies two critical characteristics of our modern 
predator laws and the “sex offenders” they target.  The first is the sex offender 
as “other.”  The second is the sex offender as serial predator. 
A.  The Sex Offender as “Other” 
The ostensive almost certain return to sexual crime upon release from 
incarceration strongly implies that “sex offenders” do not learn from the 
 
44. See JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 48 (detailing examples of legislative 
findings asserting that “[s]ex offenders” are “extremely likely” or “particularly likely” or “high[ly 
likely]” to “repeat their offenses” after release from imprisonment). 
45. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 103 (2003); McKune v. Lile, 536 U.S. 24, 34 (2002). 
46. McKune, 536 U.S. at 33. 
47. Ira Mark Ellman & Tara Ellman, “Frightening and High”: The Supreme Court’s Crucial 
Mistake About Sex Crime Statistics, 30 CONST. COMMENT. 495, 497 (2015). 
48. Jones v. Cty. of Suffolk, 936 F.3d 108, 118 (2d Cir. 2019); People ex rel. T.B., 2019 COA 
89, ¶117, cert. granted, No.19SC690, 2020 WL 529206 (Colo. Feb. 3, 2020). 
49. 538 U.S. 84 (2003). 
50. Id. at 89. 
51. Id. at 103 (emphasis added).  
52. Id. 
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experience of harsh punishment.  It suggests an impairment in the ability to 
control or choose one’s behavior, an absence of the “free will” that normal 
humans have.  As “free will” is a fundamental prerequisite for full civic 
personhood, its absence entails a psychological defect in “sex offenders” that 
differentiates them from “normals” on a critical aspect of humanhood.   
This construction of the sex offender as the “other” is most explicit in 
connection with the courts’ justification of the use of civil commitment schemes 
to lock up people after they have served their sentences.  In order to find 
constitutional justification for these predictive confinement schemes, the courts 
explicitly characterize the individuals the laws target as exhibiting a “mental 
abnormality” sufficient to “distinguish” them from “dangerous but typical 
recidivist[s].”53  But the widespread citation of the “frightening and high” meme 
as justification for registration, notification and presence restrictions 
demonstrates that the abnormal psychological model pervades the popular and 
judicial understanding of all of the regulatory laws.54  As Beth Heubner, 
Kimberly Kras, and Breanne Pleggenkuhle write:   
shaped by several stereotypes including the homogeneity of 
offending, unresponsiveness to treatment, and high rates of 
reoffending. [s]ociety applies a “moral-deviate script” to 
individuals convicted of sexual offenses, which describes the 
perceived immorality underlying their behavior and serving as 
a label that cannot be shed. The “sex offender” status is seen 
as a feature within the person rather than as a label affixed to 
him or her or as a characteristic.55   
The role that “recidivism” plays in the origins and legitimization of the 
contemporary regulatory regime is highlighted by contrasting the mechanisms 
of past sex panics.  These movements, and the laws they spawned, have always 
constructed their targets as the “other,” but their focus was not so much on 
recidivism—the commission of another sex crime by a previously convicted 
individual—but rather the prediction and prevention of criminal activity by 
mentally defective individuals.  The recidivism meme leads to the same kind of 
explanation for sexual violence, but without “the racist and homophobic 
dispositions of the earlier panics.”56 
 
53. Kansas v. Crane, 534 U.S. 407, 413 (2002). 
54. See Huebner, Kras & Pleggenkuhle, supra note 14, at 717 (arguing that the regulatory laws 
simultaneously “fuel[]” and “construct[]” the stigma of being a “sex offender”). 
55. Id. (citations omitted). 
56. Roger Lancaster argues that “the racist and homophobic dispositions of the earlier panics 
became more subtle and less visible, while progressive rhetoric became more pronounced.”  
LANCASTER, supra note 37, at 220.  
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For example, the sex crime panic that took place in Iowa in the 1960s was 
directed at closeted homosexual men who were plucked from their everyday 
lives and shuttled off to “treatment” centers.57  It was not recidivism that was 
targeted, but rather the mentally defective “psychopath,” a term that was used 
as a “code word for homosexual.”58  Similarly, Molly Ladd-Taylor traces the 
origins of Minnesota Sex Psychopath law in 1939 to the goal of Progressive 
reformers to “identify[] and contain[] would-be criminals before they 
committed a crime.”59  The brutal murder that was the immediate catalyst for 
the passage of the Minnesota law led to a focus not on recidivists, but on 
“morons, defectives, and the insane. . . .  ‘[P]ederasts, exhibitionists, 
masochists, auto-eroticists were gathered up and questioned.’”60  The popular 
press claimed “that psychiatrists were nearly unanimous that almost all 
potential sex murderers could be identified and taken into custody for minor 
offenses before they launched their sex crimes careers.”61     
B.  The Sex Offender as “Serial Predator” 
The “frightening and high” meme also entails that most sexual violence is 
the work of a discrete group of recidivist “serial predators.”  After all, if those 
presently identified as sex offenders are “almost certain” to reoffend upon 
release from prison, then most future sex offenses will be committed by those 
recidivists, and most future “sex offenders” will be people who have been 
previously convicted of a sexual offense.  Unless the number of reported sex 
offenses is (contra-factually) constantly growing, we would expect the 80% of 
offenders who recidivate to constitute about 80% of the offenders arrested and 
convicted of new offenses (also, contra-factually).62   
 
57. See NEIL MILLER, SEX-CRIME PANIC: A JOURNEY TO THE PARANOID HEART OF THE 1950S 
xvi–xvii, 148, 150 (2002). 
58. Molly Ladd-Taylor, “Ravished by Some Moron”: The Eugenic Origins of the Minnesota 
Psychopathic Personality Act of 1939, 31 J. POL’Y HIST. 192, 194 (2019). 
59. Id. at 195–96. 
60. Id. at 200. 
61. Id. at 202. 
62. I use the term “serial predator” to refer to a specific pattern of behavior: sexual reoffending 
after having been convicted of a previous sex offense.  As the text below demonstrates, the percent of 
such recidivists is much lower than commonly believed.  There are, to be sure, individuals who are 
serial rapists, in the sense that they commit two or more sexual assaults.  There is research suggesting 
that “serial sex offending is quite common,” in the sense that some offenders who are not apprehended 
commit an additional offense.  See Hagerty, supra note 19, at 78 (reporting on the “sheer number of 
repeat offenders” revealed in the program to test warehoused Sexual Assault Kits).  But other 
researchers warn against putting emphasis on serial rapists as perpetrators of campus sexual assault, 
stating that:  
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Put these two ideas together, and you have the foundations for modern sex-
offender regulation: Policies designed to separate a discrete group of 
individuals who are inherently (psychologically, biologically) different-in-kind 
from the norm, and who are responsible for most of the sexual violence in our 
society.  Therein lies both the moral and utilitarian justifications for placing 
“sex offenders” in a reduced rights zone and relying principally on a policy of 
separation and exclusion to effectuate a prevention agenda.  
These policy foundations reinforce an anti-feminist agenda with a dual 
pronged approach.  The regulatory laws are emblazoned with the traditional 
notion that sexual violence is aberrant rather than systemic, perpetrated by 
abnormal men rather than men acting out, and protected by, the norms of the 
society.  Simultaneously, these laws are branded as aggressive and innovative,63 
thus inoculating the broader society from the argument that its own norms allow 
sexual violence to flourish.   
I develop these ideas in my 2006 book titled Failure to Protect,64 where I 
argue that these laws also serve the deep and historical need for western liberal 
democracies to define full civic personhood (“we the people”) by contrasting it 
with an outsider group whose rights need not be respected by the majority.65  
Rose Corrigan’s 2006 article makes a similar point about the relationship 
between the regulatory approach and the protection of traditional norms for 
gender relations: 
Existing research fails to grasp that Megan’s Law is not solely 
an illustration of “governing through crime” interchangeable 
with other new punitive measures.  Crucial to the success of 
Megan’s Law is its rejection of feminist challenges to social, 
cultural, economic, and legal institutions that structure gender, 
sexuality, violence, and the family.  Megan’s Law is a viable 
project precisely because it so successfully distorts 
progressive, feminist rhetoric and tactics for ends that further 
the coercive and discriminatory uses of state 
 
Although a small group of men perpetrated rape across multiple college years, they 
constituted a significant minority of those who committed college rape and did not 
compose the group at highest risk of perpetrating rape when entering college.  Exclusive 
emphasis on serial predation to guide risk identification, judicial response, and rape-
prevention programs is misguided.   
Kevin M. Swartout, Mary P. Koss, Jacquelyn W. White, Martie P. Thompson, Antonia Abbey & 
Alexandra L. Bellis, Trajectory Analysis of the Campus Serial Rapist Assumption, 169 JAMA 
PEDIATRICS 1148, 1148 (2015).  
63. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 3. 
64. Id. 
65. For further discussion, see id. at 5–6. 
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power. . . .  Antirape activists argued that rape was the product 
of social conditions that normalized sexual violence; Megan’s 
Law depicts sexually violent behavior as the product of 
individual mental defects and pathology. 66 
Understanding the regulatory legal regime in this way helps explain its 
stickiness, its staying power over the years.  It is not simply the vividness of 
crimes against children; it is that highlighting these particular crimes, in this 
particular pattern, keeps our focus away from the patterns by which the 
“patriarchy” allows sexual violence to flourish.  By focusing on a  particular 
image of “the recidivist,” the “serial predator,” as a psychologically different 
“other,” we direct attention away from the social norms that protect and 
encourage sexual misconduct and we lessen the pressure for more fundamental 
change to those central pillars of male power in our society.67 
IV.  THE MYTH OF THE SERIAL PREDATOR 
The “frightening and high” myth is a faulty foundation for our sexual 
violence prevention policy.  In constructing the figure of the serial predator, it 
mischaracterizes the nature of sexual violence and misdirects our prevention 
efforts.   
A.  The “Frightening and High” Myth Grossly Exaggerates Sexual 
Recidivism 
The foundational myth of modern regulatory prevention policy holds that 
almost all people convicted of a sex offense will, when allowed back in society, 
commit another sex offense.  In reality, the opposite appears to be true: almost 
all people convicted of a sex offense refrain from reoffending sexually.  In a 
recent Bureau of Justice Statistics (BJS) study of sex offenders released from 
prison, 92.3% of the individuals were not rearrested for a new sex offense in 
the nine-year follow up period.68  Even that statistic is likely to overstate the 
 
66. Rose Corrigan, Making Meaning of Megan’s Law, 31 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 267, 275 (2006) 
(internal citations omitted).  
67. See LANCASTER, supra note 37, at 210 (describing how legislation “individualized the 
experience of violence and was in conflict with feminism’s broader approach to systematic 
inequalities”). 
68. MARIEL ALPER & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM STATE PRISON: A 9-YEAR FOLLOW-UP 
(2005–14) 4 (2019), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorsp9yfu0514.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8FQU-7UC4]. 
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rearrest rate for the entire class of sex offenders.69  The BJS study was confined 
to individuals released from prison.70  Thus, it does not include individuals who 
were convicted of a sex offense but not sent to prison.71  This non-prison group 
would include people sent to a local jail or placed on probation and is almost 
certainly less risky than the group sent to prison.72  So, the recidivism rate for 
the entire group of sex offenders is likely less than the 7.7% detected in the BJS 
study.73   
Of course, the fact that recidivism rates are much lower than asserted in the 
“frightening and high” meme is not support for the assertion that sexual 
violence is not an important problem in the country.  In fact, sexual 
victimization is relatively widespread.74  The rate of rape and sexual assault 
annually for persons over twelve for example, is 1.4/1000 people,75 and the 
lifetime prevalence of sexual victimization among women is 18.2%.76  But the 
focus on recidivism suggests that recidivistic offending is the core of the 
problem.  In fact, as demonstrated below, it is not. 
B.  “Sex Offenders” are Heterogeneous with Respect to the Risk of 
Recidivism 
Part of the creation of the “frightening and high” myth is the notion that sex 
offenders as a “class” are dangerous.  But this assertion ignores the fact that 
individuals previously convicted of sexual offenses present a wide variance in 
the risk of re-offense.77  To be more precise, the level of risk posed by each 
 
69. Thanks to Professor Ira Ellman for developing this important point.  See Brief of Eighteen 
Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 8, Vasquez v. Foxx, 895 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2018) 
(No. 18-386), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 797 (2019).  
70. ALPER & DUROSE, supra note 68, at 1. 
71. Id. 
72. Brief of Eighteen Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 69, at 16.   
73. Id. at 8.  
74. Scope of the Problem: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST NATIONAL NETWORK,  
https://www.rainn.org/statistics/scope-problem [https://perma.cc/G2WL-RQ2Q] (“Every 73 seconds 
another American is sexually assaulted.”). 
75. RACHEL E. MORGAN & JENNIFER L. TRUMAN, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2017, at 3 (2018), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv17.pdf [https://perma.cc/ACZ8-8CZH].  
76. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE 
PREVALENCE, INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN: FINDINGS FROM 
THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 22 (2000), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/183781.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE5V-CJA8].  
77. LIN SONG & ROXANNE LIEB, WASH. STATE INST. FOR PUB. POLICY, ADULT SEX OFFENDER 
RECIDIVISM: A REVIEW OF STUDIES 1 (1994), 
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individual can be assessed, and subgroups that are meaningful in terms of risk 
can be identified.  To illustrate this point, consider the following examples: 
• The State of Minnesota assigns a risk level to all sex 
offenders who are about to be released from custody.78  In 
a recent report, the State identified 15% as level 3 (the 
highest risk), 29% as level 2, and 56% as level 1 (the 
lowest risk).79   
• In a study of California offenders, 8.9% were identified as 
“well above average” risk; 20% as “above average risk,” 
and 71% as “average or below average” risk.80   
This heterogeneity is exhibited along other axes.  Two of the most 
significant are age and years of offense-free living in the community.  Robert 
Prentky, Howard Barbaree, and Eric Janus found that age-related “reductions 
in recidivism among sex offenders are consistent across studies” and that the 
“aging effect” is “one of the most robust findings in the field of criminology.”81  
Philip Witt, John Furlong, Sean Hiscox, and James Maynard report that “The 
odds of being sexually reconvicted declined by about 0.02 each year of 
increasing age.”82  
Karl Hanson, Andrew Harris, Elizabeth Letourneau, Maaike Helmus, and 
David Thornton have reported on an even stronger relationship showing that 
the risk of sexual re-offense declines with time offense-free in the community:  
“risk predictably declines over time[,]” and “risk can be very low—so low, in 
fact, that it becomes indistinguishable from the rate of spontaneous sexual 
offenses for individuals with no history of sexual crime but who have a history 
 
http://www.wsipp.wa.gov/ReportFile/1161/Wsipp_Adult-Sex-Offender-Recidivism-A-Review-of-
Studies_Full-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/WT5T-TTH4].  
78. MINN. STAT. § 244.052 subdivs.2, 3(a)–(k) (2019). 
79. Brian Collins, Minn. Dep’t of Corr., Presentation at the 2017 MnTASA Conference: 
Residency Restrictions: Sound Public Policy or Tinfoil Hats? (Apr. 21, 2017) (on file with author).  
80. SEUNG C. LEE, R. KARL HANSON, NYSSA FULLMER, JANET NEELEY, & KERRY RAMOS, 
CAL. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE PREDICTIVE VALIDITY OF STATIC-99R OVER 10 YEARS FOR SEXUAL 
OFFENDERS IN CALIFORNIA: 2018 UPDATE, 11, 19 (2018), 
http://saratso.org/pdf/Lee_Hanson_Fullmer_Neeley_Ramos_2018_The_Predictive_Validity_of_S_.p
df [https://perma.cc/7TEN-TTQF]. 
81. ROBERT A. PRENTKY, HOWARD E. BARBAREE, & ERIC S. JANUS, SEXUAL PREDATORS: 
SOCIETY, RISK, AND THE LAW 112 (2015); see also Tamara Rice Lave, Throwing Away the Key: Has 
the Adam Walsh Act Lowered the Threshold for Sexually Violent Predator Commitments Too Far?, 14 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 391, 397 (2011).  
82. Philip H. Witt, John S. Furlong, Sean P. Hiscox, & James H. Maynard, Age and Sex Offense 
Recidivism, SEX OFFENDER LAW REP., Feb./Mar. 2015, at 1, 28.  
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of nonsexual crime.”83  Each year in the community offense-free indicates a 
12% decrease in the odds of reoffending, and this is true for offenders in all risk 
categories.84  The clear implication from these findings is that sex offenders do 
not pose a special risk of sexual recidivism forever, and that there is a point in 
time when expending societal resources on special supervision of sex offenders 
is wasteful.    
C.  Recidivist Sexual Offending is a Small Sliver of All Sexual Offending 
Multiple studies establish that recidivist violence is a tiny fraction of all 
sexual violence.  Kelly Bonnar-Kidd reports that 96% of all arrests for sexual 
crimes in New York involved individuals without previous sex crime 
convictions.85  A government study of sex offenders released from prison in 
1994 found that 86% had had no prior conviction for a sexual offense.86  The 
number was similar (84%) in a study following prisoners released from prison 
in 2005.87  The 1994 study also found that released offenders not convicted of 
sex crimes accounted for 87% of the sex crimes committed by all prisoners 
released from custody.88  In Pennsylvania, “more than 96 percent of defendants 
charged with a sexual offense in 2016 had no criminal history of sexual 
violence.”89  And a Minnesota study found that 93% of all sex offense 
convictions were of first-time sex-offenders.90  
 
83. R. Karl Hanson, Andrew J. R. Harris, Elizabeth Letourneau, L. Maaike Helmus, & David 
Thornton, Reductions in Risk Based on Time Offense-Free in the Community: Once A Sexual Offender, 
Not Always A Sexual Offender, 24 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 48, 58 (2018). 
84. Id. at 54. 
85. Kelly K. Bonnar-Kidd, Sexual Offender Laws and Prevention of Sexual Violence or 
Recidivism, 100 AM J. PUB. HEALTH 412, 414 (2010); see also Jeffrey C. Sandler, Naomi J. Freeman, 
& Kelly M. Socia, Does a Watched Pot Boil? A Time-Series Analysis of New York State’s Sex Offender 
Registration and Notification Law, 14 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y, & L. 284, 295 (2008) (showing that, in 
N.Y., 95% of sex-offense arrestees between 1986 and 2006 were first-time sex offenders). 
86. See PATRICK A. LANGAN, ERICA L. SCHMITT, & MATTHEW R. DUROSE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF SEX OFFENDERS RELEASED FROM 
PRISON IN 1994, at 11 (2003), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rsorp94.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/R4VG-FR6B]. 
87. See MATTHEW R. DUROSE, ALEXIA D. COOPER, & HOWARD N. SNYDER, U.S. DEP’T 
JUSTICE, RECIDIVISM OF PRISONERS RELEASED IN 30 STATES IN 2005: PATTERNS FROM 2005 TO 2010, 
at 10 (2014), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/rprts05p0510.pdf [https://perma.cc/R7G9-JQZG]. 
88. LANGAN, SCHMITT & DUROSE, supra note 86, at 24.  
89. Joshua Vaughn, Failure-to-Comply Arrests Reveal Flaws in Sex Offender Registries, 
APPEAL (Aug. 1, 2018), https://theappeal.org/skyrocketing-charges-for-failing-to-comply-with-sex-
offender-registries-reveal-their-flaws/ [https://perma.cc/7Z2C-JALZ].  
90. Collins, supra note 79.  
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There are several consequences of this insight.  First, it reinforces the point 
made above, that the serial predator model is false.  If that model were true, we 
would see a high percentage of repeated sexual offender arrests and 
convictions.  However, what we observe is that most convicted sex offenders 
are first-time sex offenders, dispelling this myth.  Secondly, it suggests that 
policies that focus primarily on recidivist violence as a prevention strategy are 
destined to have, at best, a small impact on sexual offending.  After all, if 
recidivist sexual violence constitutes only 4–7% of those arrested or convicted 
for sexual violence, and, as Rachel Lovell, Misty Luminais, Daniel Flannery, 
Laura Overman, Duoduo Huang, Tiffany Walker, and Dan Clark state, 
“approximately 80% of rapes are unreported and of those that are reported, only 
10% lead to a conviction[,]”91 even a large impact on recidivism will have only 
a small impact on sexual violence overall.  We get the same result if we come 
at it slightly differently: The Rape, Abuse & Incest National Network reports 
that only 500 perpetrators out of every 100,000 sexual assaults will receive a 
felony conviction.92  According to the BJS recidivism statistics, forty (7.7% of 
500) of those convicted will be rearrested for a new sex crime.93  Even if the 
regulatory laws were to cut that recidivism in half, the change in sexual assaults 
would be an imperceptible .02%.  But, as the next section argues, there is little 
evidence that the regulatory laws have any significant impact on recidivism. 
V.  THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE ESTABLISHES THAT CURRENT POLICIES 
ARE GENERALLY INEFFECTIVE AND PROBABLY HAVE PERVERSE 
CONSEQUENCES 
The likely consequences of current policies have been thoroughly described 
in other sources.94  We can summarize as follows: civil commitment programs 
 
91. Lovell, Luminais, Flannery, Overman, Huang, Walker & Clark, supra note 19, at 69 (citing 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF RAPE AND SEXUAL ASSAULT (2014). 
Note that other sources provide different reporting rates for sexual assault, but there is widespread 
agreement that the reporting rates are well below half.  See, e.g., NAT’L SEXUAL VIOLENCE RESOURCE 
CTR, supra note 23, at 2 (stating that 37% of sexual assaults are reported, but only 12% of child sexual 
abuse, is reported to authorities.); The Criminal Justice System: Statistics, RAPE, ABUSE & INCEST 
NAT’L NETWORK, https://www.rainn.org/statistics/criminal-justice-system [https://perma.cc/RCR7-
FNED] (stating that 23% of sexual assaults are reported to police). 
92. See Criminal Justice System: Statistics, supra note 91.  
93. ALPER & DUROSE, supra note 68, at 5.  
94. See, e.g., Deanna Cann & Deena A. Isom Scott, Sex Offender Residence Restrictions and 
Homelessness: A Critical Look at South Carolina, CRIM. J. POL’Y REV. 1, 10 (2019) (“[S]uch policies 
are repeatedly found to have extensive negative collateral consequences.”); Jill S. Levenson & David 
A. D’Amora, Social Policies Designed to Prevent Sexual Violence: The Emperor’s New Clothes?, 18 
CRIM. JUST. POL’Y REV. 168, 180 (2007). 
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are exceedingly expensive, have no demonstrable effect on the incidence of 
sexual violence, and a very small effect on recidivistic sexual violence.95  The 
latter effect arises from the brute fact of incapacitation; the former most likely 
because the effect on recidivism is very small, and recidivism itself is a small 
fraction of sexual offending.96  Largely unexplored is the resource-allocation 
consequences of civil commitment programs.  Their cost nationwide is 
estimated to be in excess of half a billion dollars annually,97 exceeding the 
amount budgeted (or requested) for all programs under the Violence Against 
Women Act nationally in fiscal year 2020.98  There is strong evidence that these 
programs do not achieve their articulated goal of confining only the “most 
dangerous.”99  They over-commit initially and extend confinements 
unnecessarily.100  These factors add to the likelihood that alternative uses for 
the billions spent over the years would have more effective prevention 
effects.101 
 
95. See Duwe, supra note 13, at 83; Jeffrey C. Sandler & Naomi J. Freeman., Evaluation of New 
York State’s Sex Offender Civil Management Assessment Process Recidivism Outcomes, 16 
CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 913, 913 (2017) (finding a reduction in sexual rearrest rate of 2.6 
percentage points).   
96. Kelly M. Socia, Sex Offender Civil Commitment Policies in Context, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & 
PUB. POL’Y 909, 910 (2017) (“Therefore, in terms of reducing sexual assault victimization rates for 
citizens, these programs will play only minor roles compared with broader, more comprehensive 
reentry programs.”). 
97. Andrew J. Harris, Policy Implications of New York’s Sex Offender Civil Management 
Assessment Process, 16 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 949, 950 (2017); Adam Deming, Sex Offender 
Civil Commitment Programs: Current Practices, Characteristics, and Resident Demographics, 36 J. 
PSYCHIATRY & L. 439, 442 (2008) (reporting that the total budgeted for SOCC programs in 2007 was 
$446 million).  The budget for the California program in 2019 was $333 million.  Barbara Koeppel, 
Modern-Day Gulag in the Golden State, PRISON LEGAL NEWS (June 4, 2019), 
https://www.prisonlegalnews.org/news/2019/jun/6/modern-day-gulag-golden-state/ 
[https://perma.cc/35GF-V5R2].   
98. NAT’L NETWORK TO END DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT 
(VAWA) AND RELATED PROGRAM APPROPRIATIONS FOR FISCAL YEARS 17, 18, 19, AND 20, at 1 
(2020), https://nnedv.org/wp-
content/uploads/2020/01/Library_Policy_FY21_Approps_Chart_20Feb2020.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/8A9C-MJEW] (stating that the President’s FY21 proposed budget for all VAWA 
programs was $498.50 million).   
99. Janus, supra note 11, at 295. 
100. Id.   
101. See Andrew J. Ahrendt & William T. O’Donohue, Sexually Violent Predator Evaluations: 
Problems and Proposals, in SEXUALLY VIOLENT PREDATORS: A CLINICAL SCIENCE HANDBOOK 199, 
210 (William T. O’Donohue & Daniel S. Bromberg eds., 2019) (“Research examining the effectiveness 
of SVP civil commitment on recidivism has resulted in findings supporting that the high cost of civil 
commitment and liberty deprivation is not worth the small benefit.”); BERNARD E. HARCOURT, 
AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, AND PUNISHING IN THE ACTUARIAL AGE 32 (2007); 
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Presence and residence restrictions have repeatedly been shown to be 
ineffective or, worse, counterproductive in that they actually increase sexual 
reoffending.102  The fault likely lies in the false premise represented by the serial 
predator model.  Offending against children is a function of social, not spatial, 
proximity.103    
Registries and notification schemes are a bit more complicated.  While 
some studies have shown modest effects on recidivism, most likely due to the 
improved information available to law enforcement, most studies have shown 
no beneficial impact on recidivism or sex-crime arrest rates.104  One of the most 
sophisticated studies, by J.J. Prescott and Jonah Rochoff, separated out the 
effect of registration from notification.105  The authors concluded that public 
notification likely increases recidivism, whereas registration may have a 
deterrent effect on first time offending.106  But the authors state that the negative 
effect on recidivism likely wipes out the beneficial effect of registration.107 
Other perverse effects have been observed including: 
• Changes in prosecutorial practices that reflect prosecutors’ 
reluctance to impose the harshness of registration, 
especially on juveniles.108 
• Possible creation of disincentives to reporting of sexual 
assault.109 
• Potential detrimental effects of false paradigms of sexual 
assault.  The predator model may impair prevention by 
misdirecting self-protection actions on the part of potential 
victims110, and in impairing the ability to recognize the 
 
Eric S. Janus, Minnesota’s Sex Offender Commitment Program: Would an Empirically-Based 
Prevention Policy Be More Effective?, 29 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1083, 1101–02 (2003). 
102. Cann & Scott, supra note 94, at 10–11 (citing studies that find “no impact” on recidivism 
or “increase the rates of sexual offending”).  
103. Id.; Brief of Eighteen Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, supra note 69 at 
8. 
104. Janus, supra note 11, at 291–93; Amanda Y. Agan, Sex Offender Registries: Fear Without 
Function?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 207, 235 (2011).  
105. J.J. Prescott & Jonah E. Rockoff, Do Sex Offender Registration and Notification Laws 
Affect Criminal Behavior?, 54 J. L. & ECON. 161, 180–81 (2011). 
106. Id. at 181. 
107. Id. 
108. Janus, supra note 11, at 296–98.  
109. Id. 
110. Katherine Mangan, Sex-Assault Prevention Program Sees Results, and Raises Questions, 
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (June 12, 2015), https://www.chronicle.com/article/Sex-Assault-Prevention-
Program/230861/?cid=at&utm_medium=en&utm_source=at [https://perma.cc/6RGH-ND38] (“Most 
women are oriented and trained and socialized to fear the stereotypical stranger rape and to avoid the 
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“warning signs of sexual behavior problems in siblings, 
parents, children, cousins, or others to whom they are close 
because they do not see them as ‘monsters.’”111  
VI.  THE REGULATORY REGIME IS BROADLY HARMFUL 
By casting sex offenders as degraded others, the regulatory laws create a 
dangerous revitalization of a jurisprudence of difference, continuing a 
disgraceful thread of American jurisprudence in which one after another out-
groups are excluded from full civic personhood.112  Underlying these laws is 
the stereotype that membership in a particular “class” of people signifies an 
inherent danger and degraded civic membership, justifying the creation of a 
zone of diminished rights.  The sex offender laws, in short, provide legitimacy 
to this dangerous historical template. 
These laws—both the past and the present—cause extreme pain among 
their targets, their families, and friends.113  “[T]he individual’s life chances are 
diminished, having ‘a cascade of negative effects on all manner of 
opportunities.’ . . .  [T]he social and structural stigmas . . . interact and 
symbolically reproduce the very prison from which one is released.”114 
The “othering” of sex offenders and the creation of the “serial predator” 
model, entail a steep discount on the harm to persons with convictions, and by 
extension, their families.  In fact, it is a fair assessment that the pain caused by 
these laws is invisible and does not count at all in the prevailing public 
discourse.115  This is, of course, the obverse of the pain calculus giving rise to 
 
underground parking garage or walking home alone at night across campus. That doesn’t protect them 
from far-more-common threats.”). 
111. JOAN TABACHNICK & ALISA KLEIN, A REASONED APPROACH: RESHAPING SEX OFFENDER 
POLICY TO PREVENT CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE 2 (2011), 
https://www.atsa.com/pdfs/ppReasonedApproach.pdf [https://perma.cc/D5EW-CPWS]. 
112. JANUS, FAILURE TO PROTECT, supra note 8, at 100. 
113. Cann & Scott, supra note 94, at 13 (finding a strong association between the implementation 
of residence restriction policies and rates of homelessness for registered sex offenders in South 
Carolina); Huebner, Kras, & Pleggenkuhle, supra note 14, at 717; Mary Katherine Huffman, Moral 
Panic and the Politics of Fear: The Dubious Logic Underlying Sex Offender Registration Statutes and 
Proposals for Restoring Measures of Judicial Discretion to Sex Offender Management, 4 VA. J. CRIM. 
L. 241, 265 (2016).  
114. Huebner, Kras, & Pleggenkuhle, supra note 14, at 717 (quoting Bruce G. Link & Jo C. 
Phelan, Conceptualizing Stigma, 27 ANN. REV. SOC. 363, 373 (2001)).  
115. Janus, supra note 11, at 295–96. 
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the #MeToo movement, wherein it is only the pain of the perpetrator that 
counts.116   
To say that the pain to former offenders and their families is not the only 
thing, is different from saying that it is nothing.  In fact, rendering the pain of 
registrants invisible, making them the “other,” has the perverse effect of 
rendering the pain of most victims of sexual violence invisible as well.  As we 
have seen, the regulatory regime is premised on the serial predator model, and 
this empirically inaccurate portrayal of sexual violence makes invisible the pain 
of the victims who have been harmed by people who do not fit the serial 
predator paradigm, and the victims whose harm could have been prevented by 
policies framed to address the real problem, rather than the mythical serial 
predator. 
VII.  ALTERNATIVES  
The path to sexual violence prevention lies not in de-humanizing the 
perpetrators, but in humanizing them.  True prevention requires acknowledging 
sexual assault not as an aberration, but as a ubiquitous part of our culture 
interwoven and supported by some of our fundamental hierarchies and values.  
If we seek efficacious prevention, we must abandon the serial predator model, 
and adopt, in its place, a more complex and factually based understanding of 
sexual violence that moves beyond the individual to the societal. 
I offer that the first and key step to effective prevention is to understand the 
engine driving the predator model.  If I am correct, that power is the protection 
of male privilege.  The challenge is to transform the framing and the language 
from dehumanizing and othering, to changing cultural norms; from the futile 
and discredited attempt at ritual exile of evil, to a recognition that true 
prevention requires comprehensive, empirically informed changes to social 
norms, as well sensible and proportionate measures of accountability and 
incapacitation. 
A.  Some Specific Alternatives 
In that spirit, I present a non-exhaustive set of examples of changes and 
approaches that would make a concrete, empirically supported difference in the 
level of sexual violence.  The three examples I present illustrate the principle 
of comprehensiveness—they exhibit primary prevention as well as 
interventions after harm has been done—and they are all examples of rigorous 
 
116. X. Birk, Come Clean, Carleton, MEDIUM (May 25, 2018), 
https://medium.com/@xbirk15/come-clean-carleton-7a9c1d9311a6 [https://perma.cc/BB4B-HUQA] 
(“I vividly remember him scolding us for heedlessly ‘ruining the futures’ of the accused 
students . . . .”). 
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evaluation to determine efficacy.  In short, they are a model for an alternative 
approach to prevention.  
1.  Assault Prevention Training 
Primary prevention arguably has the best opportunity to effectuate the 
biggest change because it has the potential to be widely implemented at the 
upstream end of the funnel.  As Sarah DeGue, Linda Anne Valle, Melissa Holt, 
Greta Massetti, Jennifer Matjasko, and Andra Teten Tharp and others point out:  
“If a strategy is widely implemented, even a small effect on perpetration 
behavior may have a large impact.”117  A strong example of this is the work of 
Canadian researcher Charlene Senn, a social psychologist at the University of 
Windsor, and her colleagues, Misha Eliasziw, Paula C. Barata, Wilfreda E. 
Thurston, Ian R. Newby-Clark, H. Lorraine Radtke, and Karen L. Hobden, who 
have conducted research on programs to reduce sexual assault on college 
campuses.118  They reported in the New England Journal of Medicine that they 
developed a program for college women and subjected it to rigorous study.119  
They reported that, in the study’s sample, the incidence of rape was reduced by 
50% during the year following the program.120  Rates of attempted rape and 
nonconsensual sexual contact were also reported to be “significantly lower.”121 
According to the authors: “[O]nly eight women would need to have participated 
in the program in order to stop a nonconsensual, nonpenetrative act, and only 
22 women to avert one completed rape.”122  The authors report: “most campuses 
use programs that have never been formally evaluated or have not proved to be 
effective in reducing the incidence of sexual assault.”123   
2.  Testing Sexual Assault Kits; Training Law Enforcement 
The careful study of untested Sexual Assault Kits (SAKs) yields several 
insights.  Nationwide, thousands of such kits languish untested.124  Their neglect 
has multiple causes, among them the persistence of classic rape myths which 
 
117. DeGue, Valle, Holt, Massetti, Matjasko, & Tharp, supra note 26, at 359. 
118. See Charlene Y. Senn, Misha Eliasziw, Paula C. Barata, Wilfreda E. Thurston, Ian R. 
Newby-Clark, H. Lorraine Radtke, & Karen L. Hobden, Efficacy of a Sexual Assault Resistance 
Program for University Women, 372 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2326, 2326–35 (2015). 
119. Id. at 2326. 
120. Id. at 2332. 
121. Id. at 2326.  
122. Mangan, supra note 110.  
123. Senn, Eliasziw, Barata, Thurston, Newby-Clark, Radtke, & Hobden, supra note 118, at 
2327. 
124. Lovell, Luminais, Flannery, Overman, Huang, Walker, & Clark, supra note 19, at 68. 
 
JANUS_12MAY20.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 5/14/2020  4:49 PM 
842 MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW [103:819 
create skepticism and disbelief among law enforcement personnel.125  The 
research shows that testing the kits leads to the identification, arrest, and 
conviction of significant numbers of perpetrators, and that these apprehensions, 
had they been timely, would have prevented additional sexual assaults.126  
“When this occurs,” as Lovell, Luminais, Flannery, Overman, Huang, Walker, 
and Clark report, “the potential exists to greatly reduce the number of future 
offenses across the country.”127  What is required is “better training and 
additional resources” for the officers who investigate sexual assault.128 
Putting resources into the investigation of sexual assault and addressing the 
rape-myth attitudes underlying the neglect of SAKs would have a number of 
clear benefits.  It is empirically based.  It addresses key attitudinal impediments 
underlying the justice system’s “inadequate response to sexual assault.”129  It 
addresses disincentives for reporting sexual assault, and “sends a supportive 
message to victims.”130  It is directly related to holding perpetrators 
accountable.  It has demonstrated benefits in terms of prevention of future 
offending, largely because it addresses a much broader aspect of the problem 
of sexual violence than registration and notification, which, as we have seen, 
addresses only the small end of the funnel.    
3.  Circles of Support and Accountability  
Circles of Support and Accountability (CoSA) is a program that assists 
offenders to reintegrate into society after release from prison.131   
CoSA is predicated on the idea that no one, not even a sex 
offender, is “disposable” in society.  The program attempts to 
help core members successfully reenter society by providing 
them with social support as they try to meet their employment, 
housing, treatment, and other social needs.  Through the 
regular meetings that occur among circle members, CoSA is 
designed to help core members forge friendships with the 
volunteers in their circles. . . .  But given its goal of “no more 
victims,” CoSA also emphasizes accountability by insisting 
 
125. Id. at 69; Hagerty, supra note 19.  
126. Lovell, Luminais, Flannery, Overman, Huang, Walker & Clark, supra note 19, at 69. 
127. Id. at 76. 
128. Id.  
129. Id. at 68. 
130. Id. 
131. GRANT DUWE, THE PROMISE AND POTENTIAL OF CIRCLES OF SUPPORT AND 
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that offenders accept responsibility for their actions.132  
Grant Duwe reports on a “gold standard” random-assignment study of 
Circles of Support and Accountability (CoSA) in Minnesota.133  The study 
found that participation in the program lowered the risk of sexual recidivism by 
88% (from 8% rearrested to 2%) and lowered the risk of recidivism for any type 
of offense by 57%.134  Duwe estimates that the program results in a benefit to 
the state of $40,000 per participant, returning $3.73 for every dollar spent,135  
which he estimates to be 65% higher than the return from other correctional 
interventions.136  Other studies have been consistent.137  Similarly, he reports 
that “treatment is a cost-effective therapeutic approach” that is associated with 
a “3.6 percentage point difference . . . between treated and untreated sex 
offenders, resulting in a 26% reduction in sexual reoffending.”138  Like CoSA, 
prison-based sex-offender treatment has an return on investment estimated 
between $2.05 and $3.11.139  He contrasts these findings to more punitive and 
intrusive measures (longer sentences, civil commitment, and the regulatory 
measures this paper address), and concludes, “While studies have shown some 
of these interventions can reduce sex offense recidivism, they may also yield a 
negligible return on investment (ROI) due to high operational costs.”140 
VIII.  CONCLUSION: DISMANTLING THE RECIDIVISM-FOCUSED SERIAL 
PREDATOR APPROACH 
The question posed in this symposium is whether there are alternatives to 
long-term incarceration to address the threat of violent recidivism.  My answer 
is a bit impertinent: the best way to reduce sexual violence is to stop the focus 
on sexual recidivism.   
I have argued in this paper that the aggressive laws that characterize our 
approach to sexual violence prevention are a direct response to a focus on a 
mistaken but widespread meme that sexual recidivism is “frightening and 
high.”  By their very structure, these laws are about separating a group from the 
populace.  Their structure, their framing, and their language all point 
downstream, at a discrete group.  They construct the problem as individual and 
 
132. Id. at 4. 
133. Id. at 5. 
134. Id. at 6. 
135. Id.  
136. Id. at 8. 
137. Giulia Lowe & Gwenda Willis, “Sex Offender” Versus “Person”: The Influence of Labels 
on Willingness to Volunteer With People Who Have Sexually Abused, SEXUAL ABUSE 1, 3 (2019).   
138. DUWE, supra note 131, at 3. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. (footnote omitted). 
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aberrational, a cancer than can be excised.  Their structure negates the idea that 
societal practices and values condone and foster sexual violence, cover it up 
and protect perpetrators.  They make the pain of registrants and perpetrators 
invisible, but at the same time they cast the pain of most victims of sexual 
assault into the shadows: those whose victimization does not fit the paradigm, 
whose crimes are not reported, whose reports are not taken seriously, or whose 
victimizations could have been prevented by non-mythical, empirically based 
policies.   
The main thesis is that our prevention would be more effective if it 
abandoned, or at least deemphasized the recidivism-based focus.  More 
precisely, we should put recidivism in its proper place, which is a small part of 
the problem of sexual violence.   
But what does that mean for the suite of policies that are so squarely based 
on the recidivism myth?  What are the implications of the evidence that they 
represent poor resource allocation choices, with return on investments that are 
inferior to other options?   That they most likely have perverse consequences 
that actually increase the incidence of sexual assault?  That they cause pain to 
hundreds of thousands of people, some of whom are former-offenders, and 
many of whom are their families?  That they may impair the reporting of sexual 
assault? 
I propose that the proper answer to this question is abolition of these so-
called regulatory laws, not their reform.  The very core of these laws is harmful 
to the prevention effort, and to people.  At their core, these laws are based on a 
model that is empirically false, and ethically corrupt: the idea that “sex 
offenders” are different in kind, aberrational, and are thus in a “reduced-rights” 
zone.  They stand for an individualistic rather than societal solution.  This core 
idea facilitates the harms that the #MeToo movement is exposing; it represents 
the myths that underlie the failures of the criminal justice system exhibited in 
the SAK crisis.  In short, these laws give support to the anti-feminist gender 
hierarchy that protects abusers and demeans victims. 
In contrast to abolition, mere reform would leave the core idea of these laws 
intact.  And experience has shown that it is probably not possible to have a well-
contained, limited version of these laws.141  Further, to the extent that individual 
assessment suggests that community supervision and behavioral restrictions are 
advisable for particular individuals as they are released from prison, the 
criminal justice system provides tools to impose those limits.142  The criminal 
system can certainly be excessive; but it is based on treating offenders as human 
 
141. Eric S. Janus, Closing Pandora’s Box: Sexual Predators and the Politics of Sexual Violence, 
34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1233, 1233 (2004).  
142. Id. at 1253. 
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beings who are accountable for their actions, rather than as “others” who may 
be regulated like nuclear waste. 
In the end, the predator laws are just morally wrong.  As a justice of the 
Minnesota Supreme Court opined: “Today the target is people who are sexually 
dangerous.  Which class of people, who are different from us and who we do 
not like, will it be tomorrow?”143 
 
 
143. In re Matter of Linehan, 557 N.W.2d 171, 202 (Minn. 1996) (Page, J., dissenting). 
